
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION



CALIFORNIA INSTITUTION FOR MEN RECEPTION CENTER WEST RIOT



AFTER ACTION REPORT



Date August 8, 2009

Arnold Schwarzenegger
Governor

Matthew Cate
Secretary
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

FINAL
(Redacted)

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- AFTER ACTION REPORT -

CALIFORNIA INSTITUTION FOR MEN RECEPTION CENTER WEST RIOT AUGUST 8, 2009

Incident Name:	Reception Center West Prison Riot
Incident Date:	August 8, 2009
CDCR Site Name:	California Institution for Men
Site Executive Name:	AREF FAKHOURY, Warden (A)
Incident Commander's Name:	R. A. Alvarado, Chief Deputy Warden [Response Phase] C. Y. Tampkins, Chief Deputy Warden (A) [Recovery Phase]
AAR Approval Date:	January 25, 2010
Prepared by:	Robert L. Ayers, Jr., Warden (retired) Anthony Newland, Ph.D., Warden (retired) Danny Lorenzen, Associate Warden, CIW Dean Borders, Correctional Captain, CIW

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I. GLOSSARY OF TERMS:

AAR	After Action Report
AMR	American Medical Response Ambulance Service
ARMC	Arrowhead Regional Medical Center
ASU	Administrative Segregation Unit
AW	Associate Warden
BIR	Bureau of Independent Review
BPS	Blood – Black P Stones
CAL	Calipatria State Prison
CDCR	California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
CCF	Community Correctional Facility
CCI	California Correctional Institution
CCV	Conservation Camp Vehicle
CDF	California Department of Forestry
CEN	Centinela State Prison
CIM	California Institution for Men
CIW	California Institution for Women
CMO	Chief Medical Officer
COP	Continue on Parole
CPD	Chino Police Department
CPHCR	California Prison Health Care Receivership
CRC	California Rehabilitation Center
CRT	Crisis Response Team
CS	Controlled Substance
CVIFD	Chino Valley Independent Fire Department
CVMC	Chino Valley Medical Center
CVSP	Chuckawalla Valley State Prison
DOC	Department Operations Center
DON	Director of Nursing
DPU	Detention Processing Unit
DVI	Duel Vocational Institute
EC	Emergency Commander
EME	Mexican Mafia Prison Gang
EMS	Emergency Medical Services
EMSIC	Emergency Medical Services Incident Commander
EMSLN	Emergency Medical Services Liaison Nurse
EOC	Emergency Operation Center
FAT	Fugitive Apprehension Team
FIC	Field Incident Commander
FRA	Fire Refuse Area (mini-yards between the units)
FTR	Failure to Report
GP	General Population
HGS	Heman G. Stark Youth Correctional Facility
IAP	Incident Action Plans
IBIS	Integrated Biometric Identification System
IC	Incident Commander

ICDTP	In-Custody Drug Treatment Program
ICE	Immigration and Customs Enforcement
ICP	Incident Command Post
ICS	Incident Command System
ISP	Ironwood State Prison
ISU	Investigative Services Unit
LAC	Los Angeles County State Prison
LEF	Lethal Electrified Fence
LLUMC	Loma Linda University Medical Center
MA	Mutual Aid
MCI	Mass Casualty Incident
MHCB	Mental Health Crisis Bed
MHSDS	Mental Health services Delivery System
MKU	Mobile Kitchen Unit
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSF	Minimum Support Facility
NIMS	National Incident Management System
OC	Oleoresin Capsicum (Pepper spray)
OIA	Office of Internal Affairs
OIG	Office of the Inspector General
OP	Operational Procedure
OPTS	Off Post Training Session
OCS	Office of Correctional Safety
OES	Office of Emergency Services
OPD	Ontario Police Department
PCH	Probable Cause Hearing
PendRev	Pending Revocation
PIE	Permanent Intermittent Employee
PIO	Public Information Officer
PRRD	Projected Revocation Release date
PV-RTC	Parole Violator – Return to Custody
PV-WNT	Parole Violator – With New Term
PWC	Permanent Work Crew
RCC	Reception Center Central
RCE	Reception Center East
RCW	Reception Center West
RCRMC	Riverside County Regional Medical Center
RJD	Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility
RVR	Rule Violation Report
SBSO	San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department
SEMS	Standardized Emergency Management System
SNY	Sensitive Needs Yard
SRN	Supervising Registered Nurse
SSU	Special Services Unit
VIO	Violence

SECTION ONE



THE CALIFORNIA INSTITUTION FOR MEN (CIM) MAP

THE RECEPTION CENTER WEST (RCW) MAP

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

RECOMMENDATIONS

RCW Placement – Quadrennial and Warden Audit, June 2009

CIM Mutual Aid Emergency Operations Exercise/Drills

Institution – Non Health Care

CRT Response and Communication

Institution – Mental Health/Dental

CPHCR – Health Care

Healthcare Emergency Response

NIMSSEMS/Mutual Aid

RCW DEMOGRAPHICS


Design and Mission – RCW

Special Historical Notes

Classification Placement at RCW

Ethnic Breakdown of the RCW facility on 8/8/09

II. AREA MAPS:



CALIFORNIA INSTITUTION FOR MEN

14901 Central Avenue
Chino, CA 91710
(909) 597-1821

HEMAN G. STARK, YCF

15180 Euclid Ave
Chino 91710
(909) 606-5000

CIM
Minimum Support Facility

Heman G. Stark
Youth Correctional Facility



CIM
Reception Center West


CIM
Reception Center Central

CIM
Reception Center East



CALIFORNIA INSTITUTION FOR MEN
RECEPTION CENTER WEST (RCW) FACILITY MAP

N



III. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

On August 8, 2009, at approximately 2030 hours, a riot erupted at the California Institution for Men (CIM), Reception Center West (RCW) facility, as a result of Hispanic and White inmates attacking Black inmates. The riot began in one building and less than a minute from the first housing unit alarm, alarms sounded in all occupied housing units.

First responders attempted to quell the riot in the housing units with less lethal weapons that they had available; however, this proved insufficient to maintain order for the number of inmates involved. Additional CIM responders focused on assisting the staff assigned to the housing units out to safety. Staff then established scrimmage lines outside the housing unit to contain the incidents in the affected area. However, the rioting escalated with inmates utilizing weapons of opportunity (i.e. broom handles, window frames, plumbing fixtures and shards of broken glass) to attack each other; and used fire extinguishers, pipes, and other items to breach secured areas of the affected housing units and other buildings including the laundry room and canteen. As the riot continued, the inmates came out of the housing units onto the main yard. Some assisting injured inmates, others to escalate the disruption. The staff maintained their scrimmage line to ensure security of the unaffected areas [REDACTED]



Inmates stabbed, beat, and slashed each other. They used objects like fire extinguishers and pipes to breach the screened windows and doors.



Inmates used weapons of opportunity such as this piece of glass wrapped in a piece of T-shirt as a handle.

Then they assisted injured inmates to the triage areas on the facility set up by CIM medical staff who provided immediate response to the incident. As custody staff gained compliance of the inmates, they began to arrest and separate them.

As secondary response staff was met on the facility by inmates who were climbing on the roof tops of the housing units. Inmates used various items they found as barricades to hide behind to throw rocks and other objects at the responding staff. This was met with the use of warning shots from firearms by staff providing gun coverage. Meanwhile, the institution had initiated a mutual aid request and was receiving immediate response from local authorities and neighboring

institutions.

The injured inmates were triaged by the CIM medical staff on the yard, where doctors and nurses sutured and dressed wounds. Critically injured inmates were moved outside the facility and attended to by Chino Valley Independent Fire District (CVIFD) personnel at the secondary triage area in the parking lot. Those requiring further care were transferred by local ambulance companies with custody staff escorts.

Upon arrival of additional staff from other institutions, staff was able to provide additional coverage on the facility, strengthen the scrimmage line, cuff and secure hundreds of inmates and maintain security for the medical triage and administrative areas. Upon their arrival the Crisis Response Team quickly set in motion a rescue of a staff member in the culinary area, escort of the fire department on to the facility to extinguish a fire in a housing unit set during the riot, and provide support and leadership to the systematic clearing of each building. Through these efforts, custody staff began to regain control of the housing units and secure the facility.

While all buildings were not completely cleared until approximately 0730 hours the following morning, custody and medical reports document the physical attacks had subsided within two hours and all injured inmates received appropriate and timely medical attention.



CDCR and mutual responders provided medical treatment while maintaining the safety of the surrounding community.

Injured

Approximately 1175 inmates were involved, of which 249 received injuries requiring medical treatment, 54 of whom required transport to area hospitals for further medical treatment. There were no deaths.

In the days following the riot, nine staff reported non-life threatening injuries. Employee Post Trauma services and counseling were offered to all CIM employees, who responded to the incident.

Use of Force

During their efforts to regain control of the facility, 31 correctional staff used 73 applications of force, ranging from the application of chemical agents to firing warning shots. Subsequent to the riot, there were no allegations of excessive or unnecessary

force reported by the involved inmates. A full use of force assessment is being conducted consistent with departmental policy.

Mutual Aid

The RCW riot required a significant Mutual Aid response by neighboring institutions, local law enforcement, fire suppression and health care resources. Due to the Lethal Electrified Fence (LEF), armed perimeter towers, and the local law enforcement Mutual Aid response, the institution perimeter was never in jeopardy and there was never a threat to the surrounding community during the course of this riot.

The response from CIM staff, Headquarters staff, sister institutions, the local law enforcement and fire and health care agencies contributed to the prompt isolation, control, containment and clearing of the RCW facility without the loss of life or escape.

Cause

Investigation has revealed the riot stemmed from continued racial tensions between [REDACTED] that prompted a prior riot at CIM on May 21, 2009.

Damages

Inmates severely damaged six of the eight dormitories at the RCW facility, resulting in a loss of nearly 1,300 beds. While all of the structures suffered significant damage, only Joshua housing unit was a total loss due to fire and destruction.

CDCR teams conducting damage assessments estimate it may take between four to eight months to repair the damaged housing units. The Office of the State Fire Marshal was assigned to investigate the cause of the fire.



The inmates set the Joshua Housing Unit a blaze.

As a result of the damages to the dormitories, 1298 inmates were displaced to other CDCR institutions and the nearby Heman G. Stark Youth Correctional Facility.

Inmate Housing

Following the riot, 1298 inmates were placed in various secure indoor and outdoor areas on a temporary basis. Alternative celled housing was identified and inmates were moved to cells beginning August 9, 2009. All inmates were eventually moved from temporary housing by August 12, 2009. (Refer to Section II).

Subsequent Investigation

Following investigation into the riot, 216 inmates received rules violation reports and 199 were placed into Administration Segregation Unit.

The Special Services Unit, under the direction of the Office of Correctional Safety, [REDACTED] identify/validate prison gang associates and members of outside disruptive groups. As a result [REDACTED], 13 EME, one NLR, and one BGF were identified as well as 78 inmates associated with disruptive groups.

Associated Costs:

As of 9/24/09, an estimated \$1,951,926 in overtime and equipment expenditures was incurred as a result of the Riot. This does not include the infrastructure costs to refurbish/rebuild the RCW facility. This includes medical guarding and custody functions; the cost for medical personnel is not included. (Refer to **Attachment E** for a more detailed breakdown of the associated riot expenses.)

Review & Recommendations

The review team found that CIM custody staff responded consistent with their training. The management team implemented the EOC and utilized NIMS/SEMS model to effect management of the incident. There were some problems identified with communication between the EOC, the Unified Command and the Field Incident Command; however, the handling of the incident was not significantly impacted by these shortcomings. Overall the review team found the staff involved were able to adapt and overcome the communication, staffing, and equipment issues and brought this event to a successful conclusion. In addition, the review team commends the CIM medical staff for their professional handling of the incident.

There were three areas identified that had been previously addressed in prior Corrective Action Plans that had not been addressed as recommended prior to the riot, they were: (1) Housing of 3 inmates with a classification score of 35 or greater on the RCW facility; (2) Failure to conduct joint training of the emergency operations exercise/drills with the Mutual Aid agencies; and (3) accessibility of emergency supplies, training in emergency medical procedures, and comprehensive review of emergency response at CIM and other institutions. None of these items significantly impacted the management of the incident.

This report sets forth 14 recommendations by the review team to improve processes within CIM. None of the items had a critical impact on the August 8, 2009, riot, with the exception of inability to initially identify injured inmates being transported to area hospitals. The recommendation by the team was for the CDCR to purchase the Identix Integrated Biometric Identification System (IBIS) hand held wireless devices used by the local law enforcement during the incident to identify the inmates.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS:

Institution – Non Health Care

≈ RCW Placement – Quadrennial and Warden Audit, June 2009:

- There was one discrepancy found in relation to the Office of the Inspector General's (OIG) Quadrennial and Warden Audit at CIM dated June 2009 (refer to **Attachment A**), as three inmates were housed on the RCW yard with a classification score over 35 points beyond the 24 hours threshold. However, CIM's Operational Supplement to DOM Section 61010.4, dated March 2009, states inmates with a prior Placement Score of 28 to 51 may be placed at RCW on a case-by-case basis with the approval of a Correctional Counselor II, Correctional Counselor III, or a Correctional Captain.

The team found that there was no tracking system in place to identify who approved an inmate for RCW placement, once the case-by-case review was completed. It is recommended that the RCC Transportation Office establish a tracking system, and OP 61010.4 be amended accordingly.

≈ CIM Mutual Aid Emergency Operations Exercise/Drills:

The team found that the joint training of the emergency operations exercise/drills with the Mutual Aid agencies and the Medical Department's emergency operations drills, outlined in the RCW Riot Corrective Action Plan (2006) (refer to **Attachment B**) has not been completed to date.

The team recommends this training occur as soon as possible. This training should include training on communication between each of the entities.

≈ Crisis Response Team (CRT) Response and Communication:


[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

- 
- CRT was activated and used tactical measures to extract an officer from the culinary, provided cover for the outside fire department, and regained control of the yard.

It is recommended that EOU complete a tactical "hot wash" of the incident with CIM CRT on the deployment, involvement, and actions used. The best practices and lessons learned can be used statewide to improve the Department's CRT program. It is recommended, that immediately following a riot, EOU should be automatically deployed to complete a review.

≈ Jail Processing of Parole Violators:

Evidence indicates that this riot was mainly driven by gang behavior and racial hatred of street gang members. Mixing multi-level Reception Center inmates in a dormitory environment, especially Parole Violators with gang histories, is a recipe for conflict.

CIM has developed a pilot process to identify, classify, and transfer intake cases from the Los Angeles County Jail to permanent housing, bypassing the usual Reception Center Process.

CDCR is validating this model in the Reception Center Action Plan: Statewide County Jail Backlog and CIM Riot Contingency Plan.

We recommend that this model be pursued aggressively, with the goal to expand this model throughout the State. This process could accelerate the intake processing, save processing costs; prevent long term grouping of disruptive, unclassified inmates in reception centers, new commitments, and parole violators in the Reception Centers.

≈ Post-Riot Review of Alarm Response/Report Writing Training:

It is clear from staff reports, interviews and training reviews that CIM staff response was consistent with their training.

We recommend a joint after action review be conducted by CIM In-Service Training and CDCR Emergency Operations Unit. The purpose of this review would be to:

- *Validate past training.*
- *Suggest modifications to training.*
- *Determine "Best Practices".*

We also recommend that the CIM In-Service Training Department review the Report Writing Lesson Plan. Several of the CDCR 837-C forms were brief and did not contain an adequate description of the actions performed by the writer. Most of the reports also failed to note time lines for significant events. This made it difficult to determine/verify the actual sequence of events.

≈ DA's Office to provide timely and accurate advice to CIM ISU:

We recommend CIM work with the San Bernardino County District Attorney's (DA) Office to assign an Investigator to work on site with CIM ISU staff at least weekly. The purpose is to provide timely and accurate advice to CIM ISU in identifying crimes for prosecution, reviewing crime scenes, and preparing cases for prosecution.

≈ Explore Modern Technology to Identify Inmates:

When injured inmates were triaged for treatment at outside hospitals, identification was an issue. Inmates could not be removed from the institution without being properly identified and few, if any, of the injured inmates had any identification when brought to the triage areas.

In this riot, either inmate photographs or the stationary Livescan systems were available to identify the inmates in the triage area. The responding local law enforcement Mutual Aid units use their Identix Integrated Biometric Identification System (IBIS) to identify the inmates prior to transport. This is a hand held wireless device on which a person places a thumb and immediate LiveScan information is produced. This device enabled timely processing to outside hospitals of injured inmates.

It is recommended the CDCR seriously consider having at least one of these devices available at each institution. The team found the associated cost for the IBIS (or similar) unit ranges from \$700.00 to \$3500.00 each, plus the cost to integrate the system to the agencies computer system.

≈ Gang Management:

In the mid-1970's, CDCR implemented a gang management policy which allowed for Prison Gang members to be validated and endorsed for placement in the Security Housing Units. The policy requires that three independent items must be used to identify an inmate as a member or associate of a Prison Gang. The policy was implemented due to the continued violence initiated by Prison Gangs. The policy doesn't necessarily require an overt criminal act; only a validation in order for an inmate to be placed in SHU. Over the course of the last 35 years, Prison Gangs extended their reach into prison disruptive groups, and have become much more sophisticated in maintaining control of criminal activities as well as inmate populations.

We recommend that CDCR rejuvenate its Gang Workgroup to identify specific "gang behavior" and make BEHAVIOR, not necessarily gang membership, the primary factor for placement in SHU as opposed to a validation LABEL.

≈ Disciplinary Process:

The August 8, 2009, riot at CIM-RCW was racial in nature. Graffiti and intelligence reports indicate clear racial hatred. The institution and CDCR, historically approach such incidents merely as riots and the inmates are historically charged with "Participation in a Riot." While such a charge and approach may be appropriate in most cases there is little deterrent value.

We recommend that, in the future, CDCR consider incidents of this nature to be "Hate Crimes" and to prosecute inmate leaders accordingly. We further recommend that CDCR consider requesting legislation that would carry significant sentences for inmates convicted of "Hate Crimes" in prison.

≈ Reception Center (unclassified inmates) Housed in Dorm and Dayroom settings:

▪ CIM instituted the following steps to mitigate the riot:

- a. Following the 2006 riot, CIM plant operations staff secured all bunks to the floor in the RCW housing units.
- b. Placed the inmates on Modified Programming to include controlled feeding, no dayroom activities, no yard.
- c. Initiated searches of the housing units to find potential weapons.
- d. Hired extra response staff to patrol the yard.
- e. Had the inmates, after the evening meal, remove their clothing down to their boxers and T-shirts. The inmates were ordered to remain on their bunks.
- f. Interviewed inmates to gather intelligence on the validity of the information received.

Regardless of the steps taken to mitigate the inmates actions, the inmates housed at RCE (Alpine and Butte Dayrooms), RCC (Madrone Dayroom), and RCW (all dorms) still rioted. The common theme in each of these incidents is that the inmates were housed in dayrooms or dorm settings.

It is recommended that the CDCR review the housing of unclassified inmates in Reception Center dayrooms and/or dorms. Although 92% (59% Level I, 33% Level II) of the inmates housed on RCW facility were Level I and II inmates, this did not stop their behavior.

≈ Video cameras (stationary or portable):

There were no video cameras (stationary or portable) available to be used to document the event. This would have helped to identify the suspects; gather

evidence for subsequent disciplinary hearings or trials; identify gang members; and provide an evaluation tool of the tactics/training given to the staff.

It is recommended CIM locate or purchase high quality, long range, video cameras (stationary and portable) to identify the suspects; gather evidence for subsequent disciplinary hearings or trials; identify gang members; and provide an evaluation tool of the tactics/training given to the staff. They should be part of the [REDACTED] response equipment.

≈ Releasing the Inmates Prior to investigation or identification:

There were 20 inmate departures from the RCW yard prior to the completion of the investigation, identification, and the completion of the CDCR 804's and RVR's. One, charged with Conspiracy to Commit Murder, went Out to Court; one, charged with Battery with a Deadly Weapon, was released to ICE; and of the rest, who were charged with participation and/or inciting a riot, two were discharged and released.

It is recommended that CDCR explore the legality of appropriately holding inmates, with imminent release dates, pending the completion of the investigation into their involvement in a riot.

Institution – Mental Health/Dental:

No issues noted at this time.

CPHCR – Health Care

≈ Healthcare Emergency Response:

- CIM had limited ability to obtain the medical resources (staff, supplies, and equipment) necessary to meet the medical demands of this riot and to provide relief for responding CIM staff. Actual local, regional, and statewide procedures and training for response to a large scale medical disaster appear to be very limited.
- Coordinating the response from sister institutions, parole, and other state agencies is most effectively managed from the Regional and Headquarters levels.
- There are limited procedures in Healthcare for response to an impending major incident.
- After action discussions have also identified the need for glow in the dark triage bands and tarps, backboards, cervical collars, and flashlights for emergency

response as well as liaison for massive inmate family inquiries. CIM staff were reduced to using records cardboard boxes as splints.

- After the riot the priority was tracking inmates for follow-up care. Carry Meds at RCW were destroyed. Because inmates were dispersed throughout CIM and across the State, medication administration was impeded.

*The team recommends that the Office of Correctional Safety coordinate with CDCR Healthcare and the California Prison Receiver in order to prepare statewide policy, procedure, and training for prompt, effective, coordinated statewide Healthcare response to any large scale prison disturbance. This recommendation is consistent with the 11/22/06 Inspector General Report recommendations #4, 5, 7, & 8, on the Gonzales Incident, concerning the accessibility of emergency supplies, training in emergency medical procedures, and comprehensive review of emergency response at CIM and other institutions. The CIM follow up CAP of 4/09 reports that most elements of the Inspector Generals Healthcare Recommendations are Statewide in scope and have not been implemented pending authorization of the Receiver. (Refer to **Attachment C**, Office of the Inspector General Follow-up Report (11/21/06).*

- After hours contact with the Regional Medical Office was impeded because there was no available listing of home telephone numbers.

The Regional Medical Administrator has implemented a procedure region wide for 24 hour access to key administrators.

NIMS/SEMS/Mutual Aid:

≈ Inconsistent Communications:

- At the onset of the riot, the Field Incident Commander (FIC) was on the yard at ground zero. He immediately took charge of the incident and gave directions to the response staff. The Associate Warden (AW) for RCW reported to the RCW yard at ground zero. They both provided information directly to the Emergency Command Center (EOC). The Incident Command Post (ICP) was not established at the RCW facility. Although the Planning and Intelligence Section Chief from the EOC sent a representative to the RCW yard to gather information, this was independent of both the IC and the RCW AW. Consequently, the EOC and the staff at ground zero worked independently, with marginal communication with each other. The Medical Department also worked independently as well.
- Some responding staff arrived at RCW without the proper [REDACTED] equipment; others arrived with [REDACTED] equipment. This needs to be reviewed by CIM

Management. Staff without the proper equipment placed themselves in jeopardy and their effectiveness was limited.

- During the operation, the staff stated it was difficult to hear each other, due to the noise created by the helicopter flying at low levels over the prison. At first, it was believed the helicopter belonged to the news media. However, it was later determined that it was the San Bernardino Sheriff's Department helicopter, providing support to the officers on the ground. Also, CRT was not able to communicate with the Mutual Aid police and fire department.
- There was a lack of communication between the Unified Command, the ICP and the EOC. This was caused by the lack of available Management Staff needed to establish the ICP and the lack of radios or cell phones with direct connect capabilities.
- During the Mutual Aid debrief, it was noted the EOC representative (Correctional Sergeant) in the Unified Command needed to be at a level to make high level decisions, such as a Correctional Captain. It was also stated that a representative from the Unified Commander was not in the EOC.
- There were conflicting directions given to the CRT. The field staff wanted the team to continue restraining the inmates on the yard, while the Emergency Operations center (EOC) directed the team to continue the control/containment efforts of the East side housing units and attached Fire Refuge Areas (mini-yards).
- Coordination of ambulance response, outside hospitals, and additional triage and treatment of the injured was provided by the Unified Command, managed by the CPD. This group lacked radio communication with CIM.

It is recommended that CIM continue to train their staff on the NIMS/SEMS protocols and review their established model. CIM is advanced in the operation; however, communication between all entities involved remains an area of concern. One of the largest gaps in the communication chain was a lack of a representative in the EOC from the Unified Command (fire and police) and a high ranking representative from CIM in the Unified Command.

≈ Recovery Phase:

The CIM Management team had the following concerns during the debrief meeting:

- CIM Management staff believe that during the Recovery Phase, the EOC and DOC should have been deactivated on Sunday, 8/9/09, by 1000 hours. The

associated recovery issues could have been completed by the Associate Warden, directly responsible for the task(s) to be completed; to include the establishment of a local task force to handle the related issues.

- As a result of the pressure by the DOC to complete several objectives with challenging time lines, the IC began to take more control and usurp the authority for the Section Chiefs.
- By keeping the EOC activated, the managers' ability to get their operations back to normal was impeded.

The team recommends a joint after action review be conducted by CIM Management and CDCR Emergency Operations Unit to determine "Best Practices" and the practices that are not within the intent of the NIMS/SEMS model. Provide training or make changes as needed.

V. RCW DEMOGRAPHICS:

≈ Design and Mission – RCW:

This facility was constructed in 1961 and was originally designed to be a California Department of Forestry (CDF) Fire Training Camp. Since that time RCW's mission has changed to become one of three (3) Reception Center (RC) Facilities at CIM. RCW currently has a total housing capacity of 1482. At the time of the incident, 198 beds in Laguna Hall were closed due to renovation. The 1645 facility count was 1292 (an additional 6 were subsequently transferred in for a total of 1298).

RCW is a Level II facility, which provides housing for RC inmates during initial intake processing of New Commitments (N/C), Parole Violators, Returned to Custody (PV/RTC), Parole Violators, Pending Revocation (PendRev), Parole Violators, with a New Term (PV/WNT), as well as Minimum Support Facility (MSF), Camp, and Community Correctional Facility (CCF) Higher Custody rollups.

Each month 52% of the inmates at RCW "turn over" as a result of the Detention Processing Unit (DPU), Parole, Continuing on Parole (COP), or In Custody Drug Treatment Program (ICDTP) releases.

	3/09	4/09	5/09	6/09	7/09	8/09	Total:	Average:	Percentage:
DPU's:	315	309	344	255	227	169	1619	270	18%
Paroles:	234	251	199	204	201	394	1483	247	17%
COP/ICOTP:	250	245	349	319	224	112	1499	250	17%
Total Per Month (Base on the RCW capacity of 1482):									52%

All RCW housing units are racially integrated. The RCW's perimeter security consists of a Lethal Electrified Fence (LEF), four (4) Towers, and a dedicated outside patrol. The Towers are not posted when the LEF is energized. Located within the inner perimeter of the facility are eight (8) housing units, an Administration Building, Facility Control, Medical Department, Visiting Area, Medical Hub, Chapel, Culinary, and Receiving & Release (R&R). Each housing unit has a maximum capacity of 198 inmates, with the exception of Angeles Hall, which has a capacity of 96. Angeles is utilized to house the 51 facility Permanent Work Crew (PWC) inmates and 45 overflow RC process inmates.

≈ Special Historical Notes:

Dedicated on June 21, 1941, the California Institution for Men (CIM) was the first major minimum security institution built and operated in the United States. It was the State of California's third correctional institution and was constructed to relieve the overcrowded conditions of San Quentin State Prison (1852) and Folsom State Prison (1881).

CIM was unique in the field of penology because it was known as the “prison without walls”. The only “security” fence around the facility units was a five-strand livestock fence, intended mainly to keep the dairy cows from wandering through the living areas.

CIM has since increased security to meet the challenges a vastly different inmate population requires. While no longer known as “the prison without walls”, CIM’s Minimum Support Facility (MSF) still houses the largest Level I inmate population within the California prison system. The MSF has approximately 2700 minimum custody level beds at the facility.

In addition to the MSF, CIM expanded its operation to include three reception centers, Reception Center Central (1951), Reception Center West (1961), and Reception Center East (which was acquired from the California Youth Authority in 1970).

SECTION TWO



EVENTS, INFORMATION, AND ACTIONS PRECEDING THE RIOT

THE RIOT

CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF EVENTS

USE OF FORCE BREAK DOWN AND ANALYSIS

TACTICAL SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

RELOCATION OF DISPLACED INMATES

MEDIA

VI. EVENTS, INFORMATION AND ACTIONS PRECEDING THE RIOT:

Thursday, May 21, 2009:

On Thursday, May 21, 2009, at approximately 1110 hours, a racial riot occurred at the Reception Center Central facility, main yard. The active participants consisted of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] who were attacked by [REDACTED]. There were minor injuries noted (Incident # CIM-RCC-09-05-0204). An investigation into this matter determined that the [REDACTED] attacked the [REDACTED] due to a confrontation between members of the [REDACTED] criminal street gang/disruptive group and members of the [REDACTED] criminal street gang/disruptive group. The Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department confirmed the racial street war [REDACTED] has been ongoing for several years and is causing problems in the community and county jails.

Wednesday, August 5, 2009:

On August 5, 2009, an anonymous inmate note ("kite") was sent via institutional mail to the Appeals Coordinator's Office. The "kite" revealed that *"...a big riot is going to jump off. [REDACTED], all day rooms are to Jump off on the East Yard and the Yard as well if we get the yard..."* Investigative Services Unit (ISU) staff could not confirm the validity of the kite; interviews and staff observations on the yard did not suggest any tension to validate the kite.

Thursday, August 6, 2009:

On August 6, 2009, during a routine cell search at Reception Center Central (RCC), staff discovered an unsigned inmate "kite" in the cell of an inmate, who was later validated as an associate of the [REDACTED]. The kite stated, in part, *"...it was regarding on the incident that happen here in Central [RCC]* ...this should take place on Friday afternoon yard that would be Butte Low [Reception Center-East (RCE)] when they come on to yard. So the east would go off first and everybody else will follow suit. I'm sure they will know when this is taking place every yard & dayroom are to follow suit..."*

Staff confirmed that Butte Low at RCE was scheduled for yard the following day. Coupled with the previous kite, the management team elected to place the institution on Modified Program (confinement to cell and/or dormitory, no yard privileges or visiting) pending further investigation. Appropriate notification to Division of Adult Institution administrative staff was completed. Interviews and searches of the prison were initiated.

Friday, August 7, 2009:

On August 7, 2009, at 1418 hours, a riot erupted in Alpine and Butte Hall Dayrooms between Black and Hispanic general population inmates at RCE. Multiple force options were utilized to quickly quell the rioting inmates [REDACTED]

On the same day, at 2140 hours, a riot erupted in the Madrone Hall Dayroom at RCC between Black and Hispanic General Population Inmates [REDACTED]. Multiple force options were utilized to quell this disturbance. Before the other dorms in RCC had an opportunity to clash, the Watch Commander removed the black inmates from the dayrooms at RCC.

The CIM Management team assigned four additional Search and Escort officers to the RCW facility to provide extra security. Searches were initiated to determine the volatility of the inmate population. During a search of the Mariposa Housing Unit on August 7, 2009, two inmate manufactured weapons made of flat metal stock were found in the trash cans.

VII. THE RIOT:

Staffing levels:

The following are the RCW Second and Third Watch staffing levels for the RCW facility on the day of the riot:

	Second Watch	Third Watch
Regular Staffing	46	39
Additional Staffing*	4	4

51 Additional staffing was added based on the earlier disturbance at the RCE facility.

August 8, 2009:

The RCW facility remained on Modified Program with the additional staff assigned. In addition to being restricted to their housing units, the inmates were required to only wear boxers and T-shirts and remain on their assigned bunks. As a precautionary measure, the Watch Commander identified an additional response team to respond to the facility in the event of an emergency. This team would support the responders already assigned to respond to [REDACTED] incidents. Searches were scheduled to continue all day.

During the evening meal, searches were suspended and inmates were escorted to the dining hall one housing unit at a time. At approximately 2030 hours, the last group of inmates finished dinner and returned to the Mariposa housing unit. It was at this time the inmates in the Mariposa housing unit began to riot. The unit officer sounded her personal alarm and [REDACTED] responders arrived in the unit and formed a skirmish line. The responders observed multiple groups of inmates fighting and gave verbal orders

for the inmates to stop; however, they were ignored. The staff then used chemical agents in an effort to stop the riot, but the inmates continued to fight.

Within 30 seconds of the first alarm in the Mariposa housing unit, alarms sounded in all seven occupied housing units. (One housing unit, Laguna, was unoccupied due to a fire sprinkler retrofit). At this time, [REDACTED] responders were requested by RCW Control. Soon thereafter, the initial responders began forming skirmish lines in front of the units to contain the inmates to the housing units and the Fire Refuge Areas (FRA), also known as mini-yards.

The riot quickly escalated. The inmates utilized weapons of opportunity such as broom handles, window frames, plumbing fixtures and shards of broken glass to attack each other. Some inmates used fire extinguishers, pipes, and other items to breach the secured areas within the affected housing units, the laundry, and the canteen.

As inmates exited the buildings and the number of inmates grew on the main yard, some inmates began climbing on roof tops and throwing items at responding staff from behind the unit fences. In response, the skirmish lines fell back from the roadways in front of the housing units to form one continuous line in front of RCW Control. This allowed staff to monitor the situation, maintain security of the administration area, and await further assistance.

As additional responding staff arrived, the skirmish lines began to move forward, causing the inmates to retreat back to the housing units and FRA. Staff then formed [REDACTED] and began systematically removing injured inmates and bringing them to triage areas on the main yard where CIM medical staff tended to their injuries. The most critically wounded inmates were moved to a secondary triage area outside the facility managed by mutual aid responders and transported to various outside hospitals, as needed. Non-injured inmates were cuffed, separated by race and ordered to lie on the ground.

During the first hour of the riot, the Incident Commander (IC) learned one correctional officer and 19 inmates remained in the culinary in a secured area. The IC maintained radio contact with the officer who advised him that he was not in imminent danger as the inmates in the culinary were compliant. Upon arrival of the Crisis Response Team (CRT), they tactically entered the culinary area and safely removed the officer without incident.

Some time during the riot, the inmates set fire to the Joshua housing unit. Due to the violence, fire crews could not enter the facility until sufficient control and containment had been achieved in the area. The CRT, with assistance of the alarm response teams, systematically cleared the areas necessary and escorted fire crews on to the facility to extinguish the fire. The custody staff then continued their systematic clearance of the remaining portions of the facility. Order was fully restored by 0730 hours on August 9, 2009.

Upon arrival of additional staff from other institutions, staff was able to provide additional coverage on the facility, strengthen the scrimmage lines, cuff and secure hundreds of inmates and maintain security for the medical triage and administrative areas. Upon their arrival, the Crisis Response Team quickly set in motion a rescue of a staff member in the culinary area, escort of the fire department on to the facility to extinguish a fire in a housing unit set during the riot, and provide support and leadership to the systematic clearing of each building. Through these efforts, custody staff began to regain control of the housing units and secure the facility.

While all buildings were not completely cleared until approximately 0730 hours the following morning, custody and medical reports document the physical attacks had subsided within two hours and all injured inmates received appropriate and timely medical attention.

VIII. CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF EVENTS:

During a large scale Riot such as this, it is often difficult to assess accuracy of information as it is being documented in a timeline. Therefore, some information gathered during the timeline may not be accurate. Refer to the report for the most accurate information.

<u>Time</u>	<u>Event</u>
<u>SATURDAY, 8/08/09</u>	
2030 hours	Reception Center – West (RCW) began to Riot. An alarm sounded in the Mariposa Dormitory. Within 30 seconds of the initial alarm, the other unit alarms were activated.
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
2045 hours	Ayala Park (Central & Edison) designated staging area for OPD.

		Equipment (batons and shields) issued to officers. (OPD)
2052	hours	AMR ambulance arrived at the CIM Main Gate
2110	hours	EOC requested all available CIM staff to report to RCW.
2113	hours	Associate Director M. Poulos arrives at the EOC.
2115	hours	Associate Director M. Poulos contacted Headquarters staff declaring a State of Emergency at CIM.
2122	hours	Triage area set up West of the RCW Control, behind the yard fence in front of visiting area.
2130	hours	EOC notified the Board of Independent Review (BIR)
2135	hours	Departmental AOD contacted.
2137	hours	RCW Joshua housing unit is reported on fire.
2150	hours	Chief Deputy Warden R. A. Alvarado assumes the duty of Incident

		Commander
2150	hours	[REDACTED]
		Media starting to arrive at the institution.
2152	hours	PIO assembles media on the Westside off Central Avenue, across from institution.
2152	hours	[REDACTED]
2206	hours	A second OPD officer requested at triage center with IBIS device to assist 1 st officer who had already began identifying inmates. (OPD)
2207	hours	EOC requested assistance from CSP-LAC, CSP-CEN, RJD.
2217	hours	[REDACTED]
2221	hours	[REDACTED]
		One staff member barricaded in the culinary with approximately 19 inmates.
2233	hours	[REDACTED]
2235	hours	CRT entered the RCW culinary to rescue the staff member. The 19 PWC inmates remained in the culinary.
		The 2130 hours institutional count cleared minus RCW facility
2246	hours	15 inmates in the triage area; wounds to the head, chest, and back areas.
2250	hours	RCW Library and Chapel cleared by CRT
		Inmates in the Clothing Room and Canteen area have set up barricades (desk and laundry carts) and are throwing objects at the staff.
2253	hours	[REDACTED]

		[REDACTED]
2257	hours	<u>Clothing Room and Canteen</u> cleared [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
2300	hours	DOC activated in CDCR Headquarters
2315	hours	Mariposa Dormitory staff office reported to be on fire.
2321	hours	<u>Mariposa Dormitory</u> secured by the CRT.
2325	hours	Joshua still on fire; Mariposa staff office also on fire. Joshua self evacuated. [Staff did enter the building twice, by there was too much smoke and it was unsafe to enter]. [REDACTED]
2330	hours	[REDACTED]
2320	hours	200 mattresses, 1000 "fish kits", 500 bed rolls sent to Heman G. Stark, YCF.
2342	hours	SSU Staff at the various hospitals to conduct interviews with the injured inmates.
2343	hours	[REDACTED]
2358	hours	<u>Otay Dormitory</u> Cleared by CRT. Eastside of RCW is contained; it is reported several inmates with life threatening injuries.

SUNDAY, 8/09/09

0005		Chino Valley Independent Fire Department (CVIFD) entering RCW yard to extinguish the fire in the Joshua Dormitory under the escort of CRT.
0009	hours	[REDACTED]
0014	hours	22 inmates transported to outside hospitals
0022	hours	<u>Culinary</u> cleared by CRT (19 PWC inmate workers removed).

0030	hours	Black inmates from Mariposa/Joshua/Otay dormitories were placed in the medical hub holding tanks. White and Hispanic inmates from the Otay dormitory were placed in flex-cuffs and stage on the yard in front of the unit. The White and Hispanic from Mariposa were placed in flex cuffs and stage in front of the culinary.
0038	hours	The SBSD deputy assisting with the perimeter security was relieved of duty by a Chino Police Officer. (SBSD)
0040	hours	CIM maintenance staff turned off the gas to RCW as a result of the fire in the Joshua Dormitory. <div style="background-color: black; height: 1.2em; width: 100%; margin-top: 5px;"></div>
0047	hours	The RCC "County Yard" was setup as a triage area.
0109	hours	The SBSD, Chino Hills Station Reserves Deputies responded to relieve a portion of the sworn personnel from Chino Hills Station that were providing security of the RCW North/West fence line. (SBSD)
0130	hours	CRT clearing the housing units <div style="background-color: black; height: 1.2em; width: 150px; display: inline-block;"></div> . OTAY and Mariposa Dormitories are cleared. The black inmates are being transferred to the RCW Hub and the Hispanic and White inmates are placed on the yard in front of the RCW control. The first bus arrives at RCW CIM staff ordered to report to work by the EOC due to the emergency.
0144	hours	Medical staff completing CDCR 7219's on the inmates in the triage areas and the holding tanks.
0151	hours	<div style="background-color: black; height: 1.2em; width: 100%; margin-top: 5px;"></div>
0130	hours	State transportation arrives to start moving the inmates to other institutions.
0153	hours	200 White and Hispanic inmates were placed in flex cuffs and staged in front of control awaiting transport.

0200	hours	<p>CIM CMO requesting additional medical staff from sister institutions.</p> <p>Associate Director and Warden received a telephone call from the BIR.</p> <p>All Southern California prisons are placed on lockdown status by the DOC. Inmate visiting was cancelled.</p> <p>Statewide conference call with all AOD's to discuss staffing, housing, and transportation needs for CIM.</p>
0207	hours	[REDACTED]
0229	hours	Update of inmates at outside hospitals – 35 inmates
0230	hours	Joshua fire is extinguished by the CVIFD.
0235	hours	Inmates are being moved from the RCW to RCC for temporary housing. Inmates being housed on the yards and holding cells.
0307	hours	Update of inmates at outside hospitals – 54 inmates with 110 staff providing coverage.
0308	hours	The last AMR ambulance was dispatched to the institution. There were a total of 54 ambulance runs during this incident.
0320	hours	<u>Borrego Dormitory</u> is cleared by CRT
0340	hours	The SBSB deputies from West Valley Detention Center arrived to provide relief for the Rancho Cucamonga Reserve Deputies and West Foothill Deputies. (SBSB)
0418	hours	<p>EOC completes a tactical assault plan for Laguna, Sequoia, Cleveland.</p> <p>Contraband grid search started of yard areas.</p>
0427	hours	EOC completes a contingency plan for the CIM-MSF. [REDACTED]

0532	hours	<u>Laguna Dormitory</u> is cleared by CRT. Day shift OPD officers arrive, are briefed of situation and relieve graveyard OPD officers on their perimeter spots. (OPD)
0548	hours	<u>Angeles Dormitory</u> is cleared by CRT.
0605	hours	RCW inmates continue to be transport to RCC holding areas.
0606	hours	<u>Sequoia Dormitory</u> is cleared by CRT.
0607	hours	Ten more inmates transported by ambulance to outside hospitals
0614	hours	Inmate intake was to CIM was cancelled.
0645	hours	<u>Cleveland Dormitory</u> is cleared by CRT.
0725	hours	51 inmates at the outside hospitals. Cal Fire – Camp Prado serves 500 staff breakfast.
0756	hours	EOC advised all buildings on the RCW facility are secured. <u>DEMOBILIZATION</u> (CIM MEDICAL) of the inmate triage areas. Advised by medical that inmates were sutured in place.
0829	hours	<u>DEMOBILIZATION</u> (OPD). Situation under control, OPD leaves scene. (OPD)
0830	hours	<u>DEMOBILIZATION</u> (CHIFD): All CHIFD units cleared the incident. (CHIFD)
0850	hours	Central and Chino Hills Parkway reopened. (CPD)
0938	hours	<u>DEMOBILIZATION</u> (SBSD). All SBSD personnel were relieved of their duties. (SBSD) <u>DEMOBILIZATION</u> (CPD). CPD closes call. (CPD)

MONDAY, 8/17/09

1800	Hours	<u>DEMOBILIZATION</u> (EOC). All inmates accounted for via Live Scan and photographs
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DEMOBILIZATION (DOC). All inmates accounted for via Live Scan and photographs

Subsequent Actions after the Riot:

- The transfer of the RCW inmates from various holding cells at RCC to permanent housing at other institutions.
- Accountability of all inmates re-housed from the RCW facility after the riot. (Photographs and Livescan used to identify inmates.)
- Plan of Operation for the 740 adult inmates temporarily housed at Heman G. Stark, Youth Correctional Facility.
- SSU Operation to identify active gang members at CIM.
- ISU interviews with MSF inmates to validate the rumors of a riot on the MSF yard.
- Interviews and debrief by ISU staff of involved 1300 RCW inmates.

IX. USE OF FORCE BREAK DOWN AND ANALYSIS:

Section IX of this After Action Report is redacted, as it documents the use of force by responding staff. The administrative review of each use of force has not been completed. The public release of this information could compromise the integrity of the review process.

X. TACTICAL SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

Section X of this After Action Report is redacted, as it describes law enforcement response procedures and tactics. The public release of this information could impair tactical response to similar incidents.

XI. RELOCATION OF DISPLACED INMATES:

Following control and containment of the riot on Sunday, 8-09-09, nearly 1300 inmates needed to be moved from the RC-West Facility due to the total destruction of the inmate housing units. In addition, immediately prior to the riot, all inmates in West Facility Cleveland Hall had been placed on quarantine due to possible H1N1 exposure. Those inmates needed to be identified and moved separately so not to cause additional exposure to unaffected inmates.

Challenges related to the inmate movement included, no available bed vacancies at the existing CIM Reception Centers to house the displaced RC-West inmates, difficulty in the ability to readily identify each inmate and, time needed to mobilize the CDCR Southern Transportation Hub to utilize its staff and vehicles. State wide

assessments of all existing CDCR Institutions had to be made, identifying appropriate and available bed vacancies as well as additional staffing needs for the increased population at the selected Institutions.

Based upon initial information that the outbreak of violence was racially motivated, the safety of the inmates was a major consideration in regard to re-housing them. Inmates needed to be temporarily segregated to ensure no further violence was perpetrated against one another. The only available alternate space at CIM to properly confine inmates, while ensuring minimal continued violence against each other, was to utilize the RC-West Medical Hub Holding Tanks, the RC-West Culinary, and the RC-West Receiving and Release Holding Tanks. In addition, the RC-Central Recreational Yards, identified as the Main Yard, County Yard, ASU Palm Hall and Cypress Hall Small Management Yards and Holding Tanks also had to be utilized as no other suitable space was available. All confinement areas provided direct access to restroom facilities or assigned staff to provide restroom breaks. Water and food were provided. Additional Custody staff was also assigned to provide security of the inmates, access to medical care and monitor any additional needs. Blankets, towels, hygiene products and clothing were also provided to displaced inmates.

The assessment for alternate housing locations at other institutions was an immediate priority, and as soon as bed vacancies were identified, inmates were transported as soon as possible to those locations. On Sunday, 8-09-09, alternative institutions identified to relocate and rehouse inmates included the California Rehabilitation Center (CRC), the Correctional Training Facility (CTF), Calipatria State Prison (CSP), and the Heman G. Stark YCF. As soon as Sunday, 8-09-09, the day after the riot, inmates began to be transported. Inmates continued to be transferred throughout Monday, 8-10-09 and Tuesday 8-11-09. On Tuesday, 8-11-09, all inmates temporarily confined in outside areas were appropriately housed, leaving only 92 inmates remaining in inside CIM RC Central Holding Tanks. On Wednesday, 8-12-09, all inmates displaced due to the RC-West riot had been transferred to permanent housing.

Following the riot, all involved inmates were provided access to CDC 602 Inmate/Parolee Appeals forms to file any complaints. Several complaints were filed, all of which were reviewed and answered. There are several appeals concerning the riot that are currently at the level of Director's Review.

CIM receives intake from several southern California counties including, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, and Los Angeles Counties. CIM also serves as the Reception Center for Parole Violators – With New Terms or Return to Custody. In addition, CIM serves as the reception for parole violators returned back to custody directly from the assigned parole agent. Following the riot, all county jails continued to bring inmates to CIM for housing despite the loss of approximately 1400 beds at the RC-West Facility. CIM receives on average approximately 400 parolees back into custody on a weekly basis and, on occasions as high as 600 parole violators a week. For several months following the RC-West riot CIM continued to struggle with

inmate housing challenges as a result of parole violators continuing to be brought back into CIM by local county jails and the Division of Adult Parole. On occasion, there were no interior bed vacancies in traditional housing and extended holding cell placement was necessary. Inmates continued to be provided daily yard access, meals, health care, restrooms, and shower opportunities during this period. Following extensive bed utilization analysis and alternative intake destinations for the local counties, these housing challenges have been rectified and currently this alternative housing is no longer utilized at CIM, unless authorized by headquarters during extreme emergencies.

▪ Inmate Transfer Details

8-09-09 1298 I/M's

Institution	Transferred
Hospital	55
CTF	0
CAL	78
CRC	92
Stark	0
SCC	30
Transferred	255

8-10-09 1043 I/M's left

Institution	Transferred
CTF	154
CAL	0
CRC	0
Stark	482
Transferred	636

8-11-09 407 I/M's left

Institution	Transferred
CTF	122
CAL	0
CRC	0
Stark	253
Misc Trans	32
Transferred	407

8-12-09 0 I/M's left

Institution	Transferred
CTF	0
CAL	0
CRC	0
Stark	0

- Average Daily Temperatures from 8/09 – 8/12
 - Daytime 98 degrees
 - Nighttime 63 degrees

XII. MEDIA:

The following media outlets requested information from the CIM Public Information Officer regarding the RCW Riot:

News Papers:

Associated Press
Chino Champion
Inland Valley Daily Bulletin
La Opinion
Los Angeles Times
New York Times
Orange County Register
Press Enterprise
San Bernardino Sun
Independent (United Kingdom)

Radio Stations:

National Public Radio
KPFK Radio, Los Angeles

Television Stations:

KCBS Channel 2, Los Angeles
KNBC Channel 4, Los Angeles
KTLA, Channel 5, Los Angeles
KABC, Channel 7, Los Angeles
FOX, Channel 11, Los Angeles
Univision KNBX Channel 34
CNN (Casper News)
German TV

Other:

Canada Council

Media Staging Area:

Media Staging Area

CIM Front Entrance

RCW Facility



Below is the Press Release that went out on August 9, 2009:

STATE OF CALIFORNIA — DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, GOVERNOR

DIVISION OF ADULT INSTITUTIONS

California Institution for Men

P.O. Box 128

Chino, CA 91708



For Immediate Release

August 09, 2009

Contact: Mark Hargrove, Lieutenant
Office: (909) 606-7068
Mark.Hargrove@cdcr.ca.gov

PRESS RELEASE

Major Prison Disturbance at the California Institution for Men (CIM)

Chino —On Saturday, August 08, 2009, at approximately 8:20 p.m., inmates housed at the California Institution for Men, Reception Center West Facility began fighting in their assigned housing units. The fighting was contained to that facility, which currently houses approximately 1300 medium security level inmates.

Correctional staff immediately responded, formed into tactical units, and systematically regained control of the housing units, stopping the inmates from rioting by using batons, O.C. pepper spray, less lethal force, and lethal force options. Staff secured the housing units by 7 a.m. this morning.

As a result of the incident, over two hundred inmates have been treated by medical staff at the institution for minor non-life threatening injuries and fifty-five inmates, with more serious injuries, have been transported to a local outside hospitals for treatment.

No staff were injured as a result of the incident. It has been reported that significant property damage was sustained, including one housing unit that sustained extensive damage due to fire. The incident was fully contained to the RC-West Facility, and has not affected the other facilities of the institution. The institution has been placed on lock-down, pending investigation into the reason for the fighting.

Aref Fakhoury, acting Warden for the California Institution for Men praised all who assisted in quelling the disturbance. "I want to thank all of the staff at CIM for their quick and courageous response to stop this major disturbance. Staff's dedication to duty was displayed tonight by how quickly and safely they were able to control the inmates fighting." He also praised staff from nearby institutions, along with police departments from the cities of Chino, Chino Hills, and Ontario, and the Chino Valley Independent Fire District for their assistance.

CDCR Administration is suspending intake of new inmates to CIM until staff complete the investigation and evaluation of the incident and all southern California institutions have been placed on lock-down as a precautionary measure.

California Institution for Men, which opened in 1941, serves as a Reception Center for parolees returning to custody and newly committed male felons from several Southern California counties. The Reception Center completes diagnostic tests, medical and mental health screening, and literary assessments for classification in order to determine inmates' appropriate institutional placement. CIM houses currently 5,911 inmates and employs approximately 2,100 people.

Update Press Release:

STATE OF CALIFORNIA — DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND
REHABILITATION

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, GOVERNOR

DIVISION OF ADULT INSTITUTIONS

California Institution for Men

P.O. Box 128

Chino, CA 91708



For Immediate Release

August 09, 2009

Contact: Mark Hargrove, Lieutenant
Office: (909) 606-7068
Mark.Hargrove@cdcr.ca.gov

PRESS RELEASE

Update On Aug. 8 Disturbance at the California Institution for Men (CIM)

Chino – Staff continue to evaluate the extent of inmate injuries and damages to state property following the riot that occurred on Saturday, Aug. 08, 2009, with inmates at the California Institution for Men, Reception Center West Facility.

Thirty-eight inmates of the initial 55 inmates who were transferred to local community hospital for medical treatment for more serious injuries have been returned or are en-route back to the institution following medical treatment.

Preliminary assessments have been made to the housing units, which sustained extensive damage by the rioting inmates. Most of the housing units are currently uninhabitable, including one housing dormitory that was completely destroyed by fire.

Upon completion of medical evaluations of all 1300 inmates at the RC-West Facility to determine the extent of their injuries, some inmates were moved to separate facilities at CIM. An assessment is also being conducted to determine, which inmates can be transferred to another institution within the state.

There have been no reports of any staff injuries as a direct result of the inmate related violence. The institution is still on lock-down, pending investigation into the reason for the fighting. All inmate visitations have been suspended.

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Secretary Matthew Cate toured the institution today to assess the situation and to speak to staff. "I want to commend CIM acting Warden Aref Fakhoury and the courageous CIM staff who responded to end this major disturbance." He also praised staff from nearby institutions for their assistance and gave his sincere appreciation and thanks to local law enforcement agencies who responded from the cities of Chino, Chino Hills and Ontario, along with and the Chino Valley Independent Fire District for their assistance

California Institution for Men, which opened in 1941, serves as a Reception Center for parolees returning to custody and newly committed male felons from several Southern California counties. The Reception Center completes diagnostic tests, medical and mental health screening, and literary assessments for classification in order to determine inmates' appropriate institutional placement. CIM houses currently 5,911 inmates and employs approximately 2,100 people.

SECTION THREE



DETAILED INFORMATION, ACTIONS, AND ANALYSIS (NON-MEDICAL)

ANALYSIS OF HEALTH CARE RESPONSES AND ACTIONS

ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT MANAGEMENT (NIMS/SEMS/MUTUAL AID)

DEPARTMENTAL OPERATIONS CENTER

ATTACHMENTS

XIII. DETAILED INFORMATION, ACTIONS, AND ANALYSIS (NON-MEDICAL):

≈ Staff Injuries:

Nine staff reported non-life threatening injuries during the riot. A subsequent review of the associated, Crime/Incident Staff Reports (CDCR 837-C) indicated eight staff had sustained injuries:

- One employee sustained an injury to his right shoulder/arm and a possible spider bite on his right hand.
- One employee suffered a pulled groin muscle.
- One employee was exposed to blood.
- One employee injured his lower back and was exposed to blood.
- One employee suffered a bruised left thigh and was exposed to blood.
- Four employees exhibited symptoms of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).

The employees were sent to US Health Works for medical evaluation and treatment. Employee post trauma services and counseling were offered to all CIM employees who responded to the incident.

Employee Post Trauma services and counseling were offered to all CIM employees who responded to the incident.

There has been no information received from mutual aid responders of injuries to responding staff.

≈ Inmate Injuries:

Per the completed Medical Report of Injury or Unusual Occurrence (CDCR 7219) reports, 249 inmates received injuries requiring medical treatment.



Of those, 54 inmates were transported by ambulance to outside hospitals for further medical treatment; no inmate deaths were noted. There were 86 abrasions, 32 active bleeding wounds, 4 broken bones, 37 bruises, 1 burn, 3 dislocations, 144 cases of multiple lacerations, 7 OC spray exposures, 38 puncture wounds, and other lesser injuries.

≈ Alarm response (Equipment and Training):

CIM provides 40 hours Off-Post Training Sessions (OPTS) to all custody staff annually. This includes one day of Alarm Response, Baton Recertification, Line Staff Impact Munitions, Annual Range (lethal weapons) training. This is continuous, on-going annual and quarterly training. If an employee is absent (e.g., long term sick, vacation, etc.), make up training is provided.

CIM's Alarm Response Policy DOM Supplement was last revised on July 2009. The objective of this procedure is to provide guidelines, tactics, and equipment necessary to safety and effectively respond to any alarm that occurs within the institution. For the purpose of this procedure, an alarm includes any electronic alarm signal, verbal or audible call for assistance, radio call, telephone, blowing a whistle and [REDACTED].

Based upon a review of the CDCR 837-C, Incident Reports, and the CIM Alarm Response Plan, it appears that custody staff utilized the appropriate tactics and appeared to be in compliance throughout the riot.

NOTE: The use of lethal force was not addressed in this report as it is currently under review by the Office of Correctional Safety, Office of Internal Affairs, and Deadly Force Review Board (DFRB).

≈ CRT Response

The Crisis Response Team (CRT) for CIM is made up of CIM/CRC/CIW staff. On 8/8/09, at 2207 hours, the team responded to the CIM CRT Ready Room to don their equipment. [REDACTED]

The CRT mission was three-fold. First was to retrieve the staff member in the culinary. Second, to clear a path and provide security for the CVIFD fire engine, so it could enter the RCW yard and extinguish the fire in the Joshua Housing Unit. Third was to systemically clear the remaining housing units. During the initial phases of the riot, the consolidation of the CRT and [REDACTED] responders proved to be successful in regaining control in an expeditious manner.

The CRT reported the following issues:

- During the operation, the staff stated it was difficult to hear each other, due to the noise created by the helicopter flying at low levels over the prison. At first, it was believed the helicopter belonged to the news media. It was later determined, however, that it was the San Bernardino Sheriff's Department helicopter, providing support to the officers on the ground.

- There were conflicting directions given to the CRT. The field staff wanted the team to continue restraining the inmates on the yard, while the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) directed the team to continue the control/containment efforts of the East side housing units and attached Fire Refuge Areas (mini-yards).
 - There were radio communication issues between the CRT Commander and the CRT Tactical Leader. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]. Although this problem was overcome, it initially hampered the team's performance.
- [REDACTED]

A review of the Crime/Incident Reports (837C) found conflicting information regarding the actions of inmates in the RCW culinary at the time the officer was extracted. A subsequent review will be conducted by EOU.

≈ Crime Scene Preservation:

Riot Area:

After all inmates were removed from the RCW Facility, the Investigative Services Unit secured the gates and doors to all of the housing units and adjacent buildings. Staff was advised by the Control Sergeant via institutional radio and the public address system that the RCW housing units and mini-yards were crime scenes and were not to be entered.

The following items were collected and placed into evidence:

- Eight inmate manufactured weapons (NOTE: these were NOT traditional inmate manufactured stabbing weapons)
- One door knob tied to the end of a sheet
- One piece of a broken wooden cane
- One piece of a broken broom handle
- Three ropes made from bed sheets.
- Pieces of broken window frames

Due to the floors of the housing units being covered in debris, diagrams were not initially completed. Diagrams were used later when conducting subsequent interviews with confidential informants in order to identify the location of the identified suspects.

[REDACTED]



≈ Facility Damages:

Inmates severely damaged six of the eight dormitories at the RCW facility, resulting in a loss of nearly 1,300 beds. While all of the structures suffered significant damage, Joshua housing unit was a total loss due to fire and destruction.

CDCR teams conducting damage assessments estimate it may take between four to eight months to repair the damaged housing units. The Office of the State Fire Marshal was assigned to investigate the cause of the fire.

Facility Planning, Construction and Management Branch is currently reviewing the re-construction needs and associated costs.

Refer to **Attachment F** for a unit by unit detail of the damages.

≈ Displaced inmates:

As a result of the damages to the dormitories noted above, 1298 inmates were displaced. Several hundred inmates were transported to the following CDCR institutions:

Calipatria State Prison in Imperial County
Correctional Training Facility in Monterey County
California Rehabilitation Center in Riverside County

In addition, the CDCR was forced to house more than 700 inmates in the neighboring Heman G. Stark Youth Correctional Facility in Chino. This facility houses wards assigned to the CDCR's Division of Juvenile Justice. A vacant stand-alone facility was used to house the adult offenders and there is no contact between the adult inmates and the youth wards.

≈ Collection of Evidence



≈ Disciplinary Actions:

Due to the large number of inmates identified as being involved in this riot, CIM assembled a task force to specifically address the disciplinary issues (refer to **Attachment D**). A total of 215 Serious Rule Violation Reports (RVR), CDCR 115, have been written. They are summarized as follows:

Specific Act:	Number:
Division "A-1" Offenses:	48
Arson	1
Attempted Murder	12
Battery with a Deadly Weapon	7
Battery with Serious Injury	26
Conspiracy to Commit Attempted Murder*	2
Division "D" Offenses:	167
Inciting a Riot	13
Participation in a Riot	154

Of the 215 inmates receiving RVR's, 199 inmates were placed into the Administration Segregation Unit (ASU). 20 inmates paroled and one is currently out to court on an unrelated matter.

The 49 "A-1" Offenses will be referred to the San Bernardino County District Attorneys Office for possible felony prosecution. On Monday, 9/28/09, the Task Force began serving the RVR's. It is noted that the usual time constraints are not applicable, as the institution is still considered to be under a State of Emergency, as authorized in the California Code of Regulations, Title 15, Section 3383 (c). As a consequence to this extraordinary number of RVR's and ASU placements, there has been a proportional increase in Institutional Classification Committee (ICC) actions. Following the adjudication of these RVR's, there will be another increase in ICC actions and, in all probability, Inmate Appeals as well.

≈ Gang Identification and Management:

On August 18, 2009, the Special Services Unit (SSU), under the direction of the Office of Correctional Safety, launched [REDACTED] at CIM. The operation was supported by the Emergency Operations Unit, Criminal Intelligence and Analysis Unit, Gang Intelligence Operation, Debrief Task Force, and the Division of Adult Institutions Institutional Gang Investigators. The operation was based on the information received by CIM ISU relative to prison gang involvement in the riot.

This group set out to identify and validate prison gang members and associates through searches of the inmates and their property. The following reflects the number of prison gang associates and members of outside disruptive groups identified/validated as a result of the operation:

Mexican Mafia Prison Gang (EME)	13
Nazi Low Rider Prison Gang (NLR)	1
Black Guerilla Family Prison Gang (BGF)	1
Various Street Gangs/Disruptive Groups	78

The Special Services Unit will follow up on leads received during the operation which identified community contacts (civilians and/or parolees) that are facilitating communications between the inmates at CIM and other inmates/facilities in an effort to prompt gang activities. As these leads are developed, appropriate interdiction measures will be deployed within the institutions and with local law enforcement gang task forces.

≈ Post Incident Recommendations:

The debrief on August 26, 2009, revealed the following recommendations related to the after action investigations.

There were no video cameras (stationary and portable) available to be used to document the event. This equipment would help to identify the suspects; gather evidence for subsequent disciplinary hearings or trials; and provide an evaluation tool of the tactics for training of staff.

≈ Associated Costs:

As of 9/24/09, an estimated \$1,951,926 in expenditures was incurred as a result of the Riot. This does not include the infrastructure costs to refurbish/rebuild the RCW facility. This includes medical guarding and custody functions; the cost for medical personnel is not included. (Refer to **Attachment E** for a more detailed breakdown of the associated riot expenses.)

≈ RCW Infrastructure Needs:

Inmates severely damaged six of the eight dormitories at the RCW facility, resulting in a loss of nearly 1,300 beds. While all of the structures suffered significant damage, Joshua housing unit was a total loss due to fire and destruction. CDCR teams conducting damage assessments estimate it may take between four to eight months to repair the damaged housing units. The Office of the State Fire Marshal was assigned to investigate the cause of the fire. (Refer to **Attachment F** for a unit by unit detail of the damages.)

The Inmate/Ward Day Labor (IWL) is continuing to complete a Fire Safety enhancement project which was previously funded and started prior to the riot.

Facility Planning, Construction and Management Branch is currently reviewing the re-construction needs and associated costs. Likewise, DAI is assessing the appropriate mission for the RCW facility.

≈ Classification Placement at RCW:

Reception Center Process cases (pending review by a Correctional Counselor for appropriate placement) are considered to be "unclassified" inmates. The Reception Center Processing utilized by the counseling staff at CIM is outlined in Operating Procedure (OP) 61010.4, which was last reviewed and signed off by the warden on 3-2-09. The RCW Placement Criteria is listed as follows:

- Inmates with a prior Placement Score of 0 to 27 are eligible, if there are no other precluding factors.
- Inmates with a prior Placement Score of 28 to 51 may be placed at RCW on Case-by-case basis with the approval of CCII, CCIII, or Correctional Captain.
- No inmates with a prior Placement Score of 52 or above.
- No inmates whose case factors require celled housing.
- No inmates with a prior court conviction, a Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) Finding of Good Cause, or a sustained Juvenile Petition for Arson or Possession of Explosive/Destructive Devices.
- No inmates with a history of flamboyant and/or predatory homosexual behavior.

- No inmates with a history of SNY placement, or currently under consideration for SNY placement. A previously designated SNY inmate who has confirmed he no longer has safety concerns and requested routine General Population placement may be housed on a case-by-case basis with the approval of a CCII, CCIII, or Correctional Captain.
- No inmates serving a life sentence.
- No inmates with more than nine years remaining to serve.
- No validated prison gang members.
- Inmates with felony warrants may be placed at RCW on a case-by-case basis with the approval of a CCII, CCIII, or Correctional Captain. Second Strike inmates with a felony warrant are precluded.
- No inmates with a prior court conviction, a BPH Finding of Good Cause, or a sustained Juvenile Petition for Escape with Force.
- Inmates must have been tested for TB
- Inmates must have completed the Mental Health Assessment.
- Inmates participating in the Mental Health Assessment Delivery System (MHSDS) at the MHCB or EOP level of care are precluded.
- No inmates with disabilities that impact placement in accordance with the Disability Placement plan (DPP), i.e., DPW, DPM, DPS, DPH, DPV, and DPO.
- No inmates included in the DDP with Adaptive Support needs of DD1, D1A, DD2, or DD3.

A review by Placement Score was conducted on the inmates housed on the RCW facility on the day of the riot. Three Level III inmates exceeded the recommended 35 point limit and their case factors are summarized as follows:

- [REDACTED] is a 60 year old White PVRTC. CS is 45. Commitment offense is Corporal Injury to Spouse. He paroled from WSP III on [REDACTED]-09. A Parole Hold was placed on [REDACTED]-09. He was received at RCC on [REDACTED]-09 and transferred to RCW on [REDACTED]-09. A Probable Cause hearing (PCH) was held on [REDACTED]-09. He received 5E for Battery/Use of CS. Projected Revocation Release Date (PRRD) was [REDACTED]-09. Inmate has a history of CCCMS, but no other negative case factors were noted. He is "P" coded for "VIO". He received a "DIV D" RVR for Participation in a Riot.
- [REDACTED] is a 30 years old Hispanic PVRTC. CS is 46. Commitment offense is Battery w/GBI. He was received at the California


Correctional institution (CCI) RC on [REDACTED]-09 with four Pruno related disciplinarys noted from San Bernardino County. He paroled from CCI on [REDACTED] 09. A parole Hold was placed on [REDACTED]-09. He was received at RCC on [REDACTED]-09 and transferred to RCW on [REDACTED]-09. A PCH was held on [REDACTED]-09. He received 6I for FTR/Use of CS/FUA. His PRRD is [REDACTED] 09. He is listed as a member of the [REDACTED] disruptive group. No other negative case factors were noted. He did not receive an RVR for this riot.

- [REDACTED], is a 25 year old White PVRTC. CS is 45. Commitment offense is Assault with a Deadly Weapon. He paroled from Ironwood State Prison III (ISP) on [REDACTED]-06. He was COP on [REDACTED]-07. A Parole Hold was placed on [REDACTED]-09. A PCH was held on [REDACTED]-09. He received 12I. A Board of Parole Hearing (BPH) was held on [REDACTED]-09. The previous action was rescinded and he was given 8I. His RRD is [REDACTED]-09. He was transferred to RCW on [REDACTED]-09. He has a history of CCCMS, but no other negative case factors were noted. He received a "DIV D" RVR for Participation in a Riot.

Below is the breakdown, by placement score, of the inmates housed on the RCW facility on 8/8/09, the day of the riot. Parole Violators, as indicated below, will have points assessed, based on their prior level of custody. No Classification Score indicates the number of New Commitments. The average processing time for inmates at RCW is 61 days (per the CIM C&PR). (Refer **Attachment G** for inmate by inmate listing).

RCW BREAKDOWN		
Levels	Number of Inmates	%
Level I	763	59%
Level II	427	33%
Level III	91	7%
Level IV	0	0%
No Score	17	1%
TOTAL:	1298	100%

CDCR Placement Criteria	
Levels	Points
Level I	0-18
Level II	19-27
Level III	28-51
Level IV	52+




The placement of these inmates on the RCW facility appears to be in compliance with CIM's OP 61010.4 and does not appear to have been a contributing factor in this incident. It was inconsistent, however, with an 8-10-09 current status update to a recommendation from the Office Of The Inspector General California Institution For Men's Quadrennial And Warden Audit, Section 3.1, which states in part "If the staff member identifies an inmate who is not eligible for RCW, promptly transfer the inmate out of that facility, and hold the staff member accountable if any inmate with a classification score above 35 is found at RCW more than 24 hours after being transferred there."

≈ Ethnic Breakdown of the RCW facility on 8/8/09:

An ethnic breakdown review was completed to ensure the housing units were ethnically balance and integrated commensurate to the overall make up of the facility. Two of the RCW housing units (Borrego and Mariposa) had large amounts of blood splattered on the walls and floors, leading the team to believe these units may have had a larger population of Hispanic and White inmates housed within the units. This would have been problematic, in that it would have placed the Black inmates at an even greater numerical disadvantage than already existed. It was found, however, that the unit populations were proportionate with the ethnic make up of the RCW facility, dispelling this as a contributing factor. The housing units were commensurate to the overall ethnic breakdown of the facility (Refer to **Attachment H** for unit by unit breakdown).

The ethnic breakdown of the RCW yard is as follows:

40% Hispanic/Mexican
29% White
27% Black
4% Other



XIV. ANALYSIS OF HEALTH CARE RESPONSES AND ACTIONS:

≈ Events/Actions Prior to the Riot:

Thursday, August 6, 2009:

The Healthcare Manager, Chief Physician and Surgeon, and Director of Nursing participated in an institutional management meeting with the Warden, where they were advised of the potential of a race riot at RCE, RCC, and perhaps RCW. Healthcare staff was alerted to be on standby for an emergency call, and the on call medical doctor stayed on grounds Thursday, Friday, and Saturday. Healthcare continued routine operations.

Friday, August 7, 2009:

Healthcare staff followed routine emergency response procedures to provide medical care for the riots at RCE and RCC.

≈ The Riot:

August 8, 2009:

There was a massive and immediate Medical Response to the RCW riot. Documentation is limited to EOC logs, CDCR 7219's, and staff recollections.

On August 8, 2009, at 2030 hours, the RCW "Man Down Nurse" responded to the alarm immediately. Within 6 minutes RCW Control dispatched the first ambulance. Within 15 minutes nursing staff from throughout CIM arrived at RCW to continue triage and medical care. The Director of Nursing (DON) arrived in the EOC at 2115 hours, the Chief Physician and Surgeon at 2130 hours, and the Healthcare Manager at 2140 hours. Four critical care inmate patients were air evacuated.

The initial medical triage area at RCW was expanded to three areas at RCW and RCC with 7 physicians. Four physicians were held back as relief. Because of the racial overtones of the riot, inmates were separated by race, and triaged with universal identification markers, per the After Action Report of 12/3/06. Custody staff used [REDACTED] as part of the Alarm Response procedures, to extract injured inmates.

Custody and Clinical staff had difficulty identifying inmates for treatment and transport. Local police provided electronic identification support, using Identix equipment in police cars and an IBIS (Integrated Biometric Identification System) hand held device.

Medical staff concur that by 2230 hours sufficient staff were in place to continue assessments and treatment. Five supervisors, 7 doctors, and 19 nurses were on

site. Per the After Action Report of 2006, staff emergency telephone numbers were available.

Contact with the Medical Regional Office at night was impeded because there was no available listing of home telephone numbers. The Regional Administrator has implemented a procedure region wide for 24 hour access to key administrators. The Regional EMS Liaison Nurse was called by 2340 hours and arrived at CIM at 2430 hours. The CIM Chief Physician and Surgeon made personal calls from CIM EOC beginning at 2245 hours to sister institutions. Pay records indicate that the clinical staff response from sister institutions during the night was two nurses. Some sister institutions were reached during day time hours on Sunday. There was some response to relieve CIM clinical providers who had worked all night. One sister institution cited the need to maintain routine sick call.

By 0200 hours, on August 9, Sunday, about 5½ hours into the incident, CIM Managers in the EOC were able to communicate with Headquarters CDCR Medical staff to request assistance. Telephone conference contact continued throughout the night. CIM requested doctors and nurses, plus dressings, sutures, and Lidocane. These supplies began arriving through the night with custody and clinical staff from sister institutions.

The 59th and last ambulance dispatch was at 0308 hours on Sunday, approximately 6½ hours after the incident began. Coordination of ambulance response, outside hospitals, and additional triage and treatment of the injured was provided by the Unified Command, managed by the CPD. This group lacked radio communication with CIM. Ambulances were staged at Friends Outside, and linked with escorts.

While in the triage areas, inmate patients were under constant medical doctor and nursing care. No delays are reported moving inmates on CIM grounds. There are conflicting reports of delays in transporting inmates to outside hospitals due to lack of custody escorts. No records validate any delay. Custody escorts included on grounds custody staff, off duty responding staff from CIM and other institutions, and the parole Fugitive Apprehension Team (FAT). Local jurisdictions were not used. By 2100 hours the Logistics group ran out of CIM chase cars and hospital kits, and began to rely on cars and staff recycled from prior hospital runs. Ultimately 54 inmates were transported to outside hospitals, with 110 custody posts being maintained in local hospitals.

≈ After Event Actions/Information:

Medical triage areas were demobilized at approximately 0800 on Sunday. Actual treatment continued until 1530. Many inmates were sutured in the parking lot triage areas by responding CIM doctors; some working by flashlight. About 200 inmates who had been quarantined for H1N1 virus were moved, by race, under quarantine. Because of mixing of some inmates during the riot, all inmates at

Herman Stark were placed on quarantine. Receiving institutions were notified of quarantine inmates.

Throughout Sunday and Monday nurses, healthcare records staff, and pharmacists located MAR's, health records, and medications for transferring inmates. Healthcare staff contacted receiving institutions to warn them of the unscheduled transfers, medical status of arriving inmates, and medication needs

249 inmates were injured, including 86 abrasions, 32 active bleeding, 4 broken bones, 37 bruises, 1 burn, 3 dislocations, 144 cases of multiple lacerations, 7 OC spray, 38 punctures, and other lesser injuries. 1127 CDCR 7219 evaluations were completed.

After the riot the priority was tracking inmates for follow-up care. Carry Meds at RCW were destroyed. Because inmates were dispersed throughout CIM and across the State medication administration was impeded. About 57 inmates were not medicated for 1½ days at Herman G. Stark. Also, 144 inmates had to be located for removal of sutures.

At the time of the riot there were about 153 inmates housed at RCW under the CCCMS level of Mental Health Care. About 81 were transferred to Herman G. Stark. The standard of care for these inmates usually includes psychotropic medications. Distribution of psychotropic medications was impeded.

There were no reports of staff injuries during the incident. After the incident the Return to Work Coordinator received 9 claims for CIM staff, including: 1 hand injury, 1 pulled groin, 4 PTSD, and 3 blood exposure. There are no records at CIM for non CIM staff.

The only available After Action Review of the Medical Response to this riot by CDCR Healthcare is the attached After Action Review by the Regional EMS Liaison Nurse (refer to **Attachment I**). Known problem areas from the clinical riot response include documentation, communications and liaison between off reservation EMS Agencies and CIM Medical. Also needing attention are communication and coordination of roles with sister institutions, sister agencies, and CDCR Regional and Headquarters Healthcare. After action discussions have also identified the need for glow in the dark triage bands and tarps, backboards, cervical collars, and flashlights for emergency response as well as liaison for massive inmate family inquiries. CIM staff was reduced to using records cardboard boxes as splints.

There are limited procedures in Healthcare for response to or a warning of an impending major incident. The only immediately available documentation of the medical response to the RC-West riot is the institutional EOC logs and CDCR 7219's.

XV. ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT MANAGEMENT (NIMS/SEMS/MUTUAL AID):

The riot that occurred on 8/8/09 was a measurement of CIM's and the Departments readiness to implement and comply with the requirements of the NIMS/SEMS. This was also a test of the local Mutual Aid Memo of Understanding (MOU) with the local municipalities.

Event Period (2030 hours, 8/8/09, to 1000 hours, 8/09/09):

≈ Field Level:

At the onset on the riot, the Field Incident Commander (FIC) was on the yard at ground zero. He immediately took charge of the incident and gave directions to the response staff. The Associate Warden (AW) for RCW was also on the RCW yard at ground zero. They both provided information directly to the Emergency Command Center (EOC). The Incident Command Post (ICP) was not established at the RCW facility. Although the Planning and Intelligence Section Chief from the EOC sent a representative to the RCW yard to gather information, this was independent of both the IC and the RCW AW. Consequently, the EOC and the staff at ground zero worked independently, with marginal communication with each other. The Medical Department also worked independently as well.

As an example of this, the RCW AW gave directions regarding the clearing of the buildings to the CRT [REDACTED] that conflicted with the directions given by the EOC. The RCW AW believed there were too many inmates on the yard, either being restrained and/or triaged, to safely bring more inmates out of the housing units. He felt it prudent to wait until more inmates had been transferred to other holding areas. The EOC's focus was on retrieving the officer isolated in the culinary; securing the South/West portion of the facility; and providing a safe path for the fire department personnel, who were waiting to extinguish the fire. All tasks were ultimately completed, and in a timely manner, but independent of each other. Although the ICP was not established, the RCW AW and FIC were able to meet their objectives of isolation, containment, control, and clearing the facility.

≈ Emergency Operations Center:

The EOC was established within ten minutes of the incident and was staffed with Management and medical staff within the first hour of the incident. The EOC was established using the NIMS/SEMS protocol, with the EOC Incident Commander, Operations Section Chief, Planning and Intelligence Section Chief, Logistics Section Chief, Finance Section Chief, Safety Officer, Scribe, EOC Security Officer, and medical staff in attendance. The EOC used the Incident Action Plan (IAP) format to list their objectives. During the incident period, the EOC provided support and available resources to the FIC and AW at RCW. Although the ICP was not established, the EOC met their objectives and provided support to the FIC and RCW AW in the isolation, containment, control, and clearing the RCW facility.

The EOC staff and the IC were debriefed on 8/26/09. They had the following concerns during the event period:

- Some responding staff arrived at RCW without the proper [REDACTED] equipment; others arrived with [REDACTED] equipment. This needs to be reviewed by CIM Management. Without the proper equipment, staff placed themselves in jeopardy and their effectiveness was limited.
- There was a lack of communication between the Unified Command, the ICP and the EOC. This was caused by the lack of available Management Staff needed to establish the ICP and the lack of radios or cell phones with direct connect capabilities.
- There were no video cameras (stationary and portable) available to be used to document the event. This would have helped to identify the suspects; gather evidence for subsequent disciplinary hearings or trials; identify gang members; and provide an evaluation tool of the tactics/training given to the staff.
- Medical staff made a recommendation for the following equipment: "glow in the dark" wrist bands, a more effective portable lighting system, additional medical supplies; such as suture kits, Lidocaine, antiseptic, etc.

As stated above, the only Section Chief that had a representative at ground zero was Planning and Intelligence. The other Section Chiefs were not able to receive direct information and feedback. During the debrief of the EOC staff, it was stated that they did not have enough staff to fill the ICP, therefore, the RCW AW and FIC were providing the logistics and operations information to the EOC staff as a whole.

≈ Mutual Aid:

Non CDCR Assistance:

Mutual aid was immediate and served in many capacities in helping to ensure security of the facility, safety of the public and provision of medical care to the injured.

The Chino Police Department (CPD) utilized [REDACTED] personnel, a mobile command center, portable light trailers and road barriers. The CPD coordinated law enforcement response to the incident, provided exterior perimeter security, security for wounded inmates in the exterior triage area and handled street closures and traffic control. In addition, a CPD lieutenant served as the Incident Commander of the Unified Command Center.

The Ontario Police Department (OPD) utilized [REDACTED] personnel, riot gear and two Integrated Biometric identification System (IBIS) devices. These devices were instrumental to the CDCR in identifying injured inmates sent to outside medical facilities. The OPD provided support to the perimeter around the prison and assisted in the triage area with identification of the inmates.

The San Bernardino Sheriff's Department utilized █ personnel who provided security of the outside triage area and staging areas, where inmates awaited transport to area hospitals, security within and outside the prison perimeter. In addition, a SBSH helicopter provided air support and initial communication to responding law enforcement.

The Chino Valley Independent Fire Department (CVIFD) utilized █ personnel, █ Medic Engines, █ Medic Truck, and emergency medical equipment such as triage tarps, gloves, biohazard trash bags, triage tags, backboards, bleach and inflatable pools for decontamination, and other miscellaneous medical supplies. The CVIFD provided triage and treatment of the injured and coordination of ambulances to ten area hospitals. In addition, the CVIFD assisted CDCR by extinguishing the building fire within the RCW facility. The Ontario Fire Department also provided a covered engine to assist CVIFD.

The American Medical Response Ambulance Service (AMR) utilized █ personnel and █ ambulances. Their staff provided patient care in the triage area and transported inmates to area hospitals.

Cal Fire provided a mobile kitchen unit and assisted in providing meals for staff who worked through the night to manage and clean up after the incident.

In addition, there were several agencies from the following neighboring cities that had personnel on standby: Rancho Cucamonga, Upland, and Montclair. (For more specific information on Mutual Aid, refer to **Attachment K.**)

The Mutual Aid responders were debriefed on 8/27/09. They had the following concerns:

- Not having an EOC representative in the Unified Command at a level to make high level decisions.
- The inmates not having any identification in the outside triage area. The outside police departments started using their Integrated Biometric Identification System (IBIS), which provides wireless field level photo and information by finger print ID.

≈ Department Operations Center:

The DOC was established at the CDCR Headquarters in Sacramento at 2300 hours. The DOC provided support and resources in support of the EOC at CIM. Based on the debrief with the EOC staff, the DOC met their objectives (staffing, transportation, and inmate housing) in supporting of the EOC during the event.

≈ CDCR Internal Response:

The additional custody staff sent from the following CDCR institutions and units were critical to regaining control of the facility, providing security for inmates that were transferred to local hospitals, and maintaining security of displaced inmates:

Responding Institution:	# of Staff
California Institution for Women (CIW)	
California Rehabilitation Center (CRC)	
R.J. Donovan Correctional Facility (RJD),	
California State Prison – Los Angeles County (LAC),	
California Correctional Institution (CCI),	
Centinela State Prison (CEN),	
Ironwood State Prison (ISP),	
Chuckawalla Valley State Prison (CVSP),	
Calipatria State Prison (CAL),	

Of special note the Crisis Response Team (CRT) comprised of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], provided assistance. These staff aided in a staff rescue, clearance of housing units, buildings, and the yard, as well as escorting of the fire department into the RCW facility to extinguish the building fire.

While conducting the after action review, it was noted that without the immediate assistance of these local mutual aid providers, the riot would have taken much longer to contain and control.

CDCR also deployed a critical incident debrief team.

The CDCR Internal Responders were debriefed on 9/01/09. There were no issues noted during the conference call.

Recovery Period (1000 hours, 8/9/09, to 1800 hours, 8/17/09):

By 0756 hours, the RCW yard had been secured and cleared of inmates. By 0938 hours, CIM Medical, Ontario Police Department, Chino Hills Independent Fire Department, San Bernardino Sheriff's Department, and Chino Police Department had demobilized. At this point, the event was over and CIM entered the Recovery Phase under the NIMS/SEMS model. (The recovery phase is taking all actions necessary to restore the institution back to normal operation.) The after action items were listed as follows:

- ≈ Continue to transfer the RCW inmates from various holding cells at RCC to permanent housing at other institutions.
- ≈ Accountability of all inmates re-housed from the RCW facility after the riot. (Photographs and live scan was used to identify the inmates).
- ≈ Plan of Operation for the 740 adult inmates temporarily housed at Heman G. Stark, Youth Correctional Facility.
- ≈ SSU operation [REDACTED] to identify active gang members at CIM-MSF.
- ≈ ISU interviews with MSF inmates to validate the rumors of a riot on the MSF yard.
- ≈ Interviews and debrief by ISU staff of involved 1300 RCW inmates.

At this point, the DOC went from a support role to taking the lead on completing the above task. The DOC directed the EOC staff on the objectives to be completed and the associated timelines. The DOC and EOC stayed activate until all of the above objective were completed. The DOC and EOC deactivated at 1800 hours on 8/17/09.

The EOC staff were debriefed on 8/26/09. They had the following concerns during the Recovery Phase:

- ≈ CIM Management staff believe that during the Recovery Phase, the EOC and DOC should have been deactivated on Sunday, 8/9/09, by 1000 hours. The associated recovery issues could have been completed by the Associate Warden, directly responsible for the task(s) to be completed; to include the establishment of a local task force to handle the related issues.
- ≈ As a result of the pressure by the DOC to complete several objectives with challenging time lines, the IC began to take more control and usurp the authority for the Section Chiefs.
- ≈ By keeping the EOC activated, the managers' ability to get their operations back to normal was impeded.

Conclusion:

In the NIMS/SEMS model, there are four phases in an Event Cycle; in this case a riot. These four phases are:

1. Mitigation: Taking all necessary steps to reduce the potential damage to structures or their contents. While it is not possible to totally eliminate either the destructive force of any potential disaster (in this case a riot) or its effects, doing what can be done to minimize the effects may create a safer environment, which will result in lower response costs, and fewer casualties.

CIM took the following steps to mitigate the riot:

- ≈ Following the 2006 riot, CIM plant operations staff secured all bunks to the floor in the RCW housing units.
- ≈ Placed the inmates on Modified Programming to include controlled feeding, no dayroom activities, no yard.

- ≈ Initiated searches of the housing units to find potential weapons.
- ≈ Hired extra response staff to patrol the yard.
- ≈ Had the inmates, after the evening meal, remove their clothing down to their boxers and T- shirts. The inmates were ordered to remain on their bunks.
- ≈ Interviewed inmates to gather intelligence on the validity of the information received.

2. Preparedness: The quality or state of being prepared and is associated with activities related to personnel readiness, preparation or plans, inventories of resources, setting up the EOC and support systems, training and exercising.

- ≈ CIM conducts 40 hours of mandatory block training annually, practicing the actual tactics to be used during a disturbance. They have [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]. The lessons learned from this interactive training appear to have been applied successfully during the RCW riot.
- ≈ The management staff at CIM has started to receive "hands on" training, via table top scenarios, on how to operate the EOC under the NIMS/SEMS format. The Operations AW has worked to create a system that meets the requirements of NIMS/SEMS. This training was put to the test during the riot. Any issues are noted in the attached recommendation section.
- ≈ A California Conservation Vehicle has been modified as the CRT Emergency Alarm Response Vehicle. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

3. Response: Demonstrates the effectiveness of mitigation and preparedness measures. This encompasses the actions taken to address the direct effects of an incident or disaster. These could include saving lives and property, care of casualties and displaced persons, reducing the risk of further damage, containing and controlling the hazard, initiating recovery plans, etc.

- ≈ The CIM Alarm Response to the incident was recreated from the collected CDCR 837's, Incident Reports (see Tactical Sequence of Events above). The staff response was [REDACTED], with additional staff response from sister institutions. Based on their training and quick response, the responding staff were able to contain the event expeditiously.
- ≈ The Mutual Aid was triggered by the radio calls that went over the institutions radios as scanned by CPD. They activated and called for additional assistance immediately, then deployed their Mobile Command Center to CIM. This was completed as part of a previously negotiated MOU between CIM and CPD.

4. Recovery: Taking all actions necessary to restore the area to pre-event conditions or better, if possible. Mitigation for future hazards plays an important part in the recovery phase for many emergencies. Planning for recovery should be a part of the response phase.

CDCR is taking the following steps to recover from the riot:

- ≈ Evaluating and assessing the damage incurred at RCW.
- ≈ Assessing the future mission of the facility.
- ≈ Funding the reconstruction of the facility.

In reviewing the management response to this event, the management team was tested on its mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery of the riot under the NIMS/SEMS model. Overall, the team did well during the event, given the staffing challenges and the magnitude of the riot. They were able to adapt and overcome the communication, staffing, and equipment issues and brought this event to a conclusion with no life threatening staff injuries, inmate deaths, or escapes. It was after the riot, and while in the recovery phase, that questions arose regarding the need for keeping the EOC activated and whether or not the continued activation kept the Management staff from completing their day-to-day responsibilities. This and other NIMS/SEMS related issues that need review are listed in the recommendation section.

XVI. DEPARTMENTAL OPERATIONS CENTER AFTER ACTION PLAN:

Refer to the attached Departmental Operations Center's After Action Plan for more information.

XVII. ATTACHMENTS:

Attachment A	Office of the Inspector General's (OIG) Quadrennial and Warden Audit at CIM dated June 2009
Attachment B	CIM Operational Supplement 61010.4 – Reception Centers
Attachment C	RCW Riot Corrective Action Plan (2006)
Attachment D	Office of the Inspector General Follow-up Report (11/21/06)
Attachment E	Rules Violation Reports
Attachment F	Custody and Supplies Costing Report
Attachment G	RCW Physical Plant Damage Assessment
Attachment H	EMS Liaison Nurse's EMS Response Report
Attachment I	RCW Inmate Placement List by Classification Score
Attachment J	RCW Ethnic Breakdown, Overall and by Housing Unit
Attachment K	Detailed Mutual Aid Information by Response
Attachment L	Photographs of the Event
Attachment M	Office of Correctional Safety Memo - Supplemental After Action Report Review
Attachment N	Inlands Counties Emergency Medical Agency (ICEMA) - Chino 'Hot Wash' Summary Final
Attachment O	Reddinet MCI (Multi Casualty Incident) Report CIM incident
	California Prison Health Care Services (CPHCS) - ICEMA CIM Riot 'Hot Wash' Minutes